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Utah 
The Perils of Pioneering
R. Thayne Robson
University of Utah
Utah's experiences served as a model in the design of the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. Today, 
however, the state is a backwater in the CETA mainstream. 
Perhaps that fate is a penalty of pioneering. Utah established 
a statewide manpower planning council in 1969 by guber 
natorial initiative and legislative act. From then until 1972, 
Utah was a manpower mecca beckoning visitors from 
around the country. In 1972, the same governor who in 
itiated centralized manpower planning chose to decentralize 
it among nine multicounty associations of government. That 
pattern persisted into 1981 with Utah listed with the Labor 
Department as a single statewide consortium which consists 
in actuality of nine relatively autonomous planning and 
operating units. At the close of 1980, when two of the larger 
counties indicated they were withdrawing from the statewide 
consortium to become prime sponsors, the director of the 
Utah CETA consortium advised and the subsequent gover 
nor agreed to disband the consortium. Utah's innovative 
period actually ended before CETA became law. For CETA 
as a whole, the state offers little to write about. But there are 
useful lessons for a study of training.
The Utah Setting
Utah, relatively large in territory and small in population, 
is surprisingly urbanized. Approximately 80 percent of its 
nearly 1.5 million people live in what is essentially one 
metropolitan area 15 miles wide and 80 miles long. As 
Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Provo and their overlapping
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suburbs are plastered onto the lower slopes of the Wasatch 
Mountains (the westernmost range of the Rockies), the met 
ropolitan area is informally known as the Wasatch Front.
Demographically, Utah's major claims to distinction are 
the nation's highest birthrate (30 per 1,000 or about double 
the national average) and one of the lowest minority percen 
tages (7 percent divided among Hispanics, blacks, Native 
Americans, and Asians in that order). The state has the na 
tion's highest median years of school (12.8) and the second 
largest proportion of college graduates (17.5 percent). In ad 
dition, 37 percent of Utah's population is under age 18, com 
pared with a national figure of 29 percent.
Without an industrial base, Utah was hard hit by the 
depression of the 1930s. The Second World War brought a 
defense-based prosperity but a postwar vulnerability which 
kept Utah's unemployment rates well above national levels 
until the 1960s. Then a gradual growth of diversified 
manufacturing, followed by resurgence of its mineral wealth 
(coal, uranium, oil, oil shale, and tar sands, in addition to 
the longer exploited copper and allied metals), reversed that 
relationship so that Utah's unemployment rate is now about 
2 percentage points below the national level. The State Of 
fice of Labor and Training estimated CETA eligibility to be 
52,000 during 1979, of whom 41,000 had been unemployed 
15 weeks or more. Nearly 8,000 persons were registered for 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
Politically, Utah shows the general conservatism of the 
mountain west. Its entire congressional delegation (two con 
gressmen and two senators) all classify themselves as conser 
vative Republicans. Yet the state is just beginning its fifth 
4-year term of being led by two conservative moderate 
Democratic governors. With brief exceptions, the legislature 
has been Republican since the end of the Roosevelt era. 
While the rhetoric in Utah is persistently anti-federal, every
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available federal dollar is aggressively pursued and federally 
funded programs are generally well-administered, in part 
because of an oversupply of well-trained administrators.
Utah as a CETA Pioneer
Utah's pioneer position in CETA was part of a drive by its 
1965-76 Governor, Calvin Rampton, to strengthen the 
Governor's office by consolidating state activities. During 
his first 4-year term, he had learned that the governor was 
largely a figurehead with power vested in the relatively 
autonomous merit system-protected department heads. 
Many of these departments operated with federal funds and 
were somewhat autonomous of the legislature as well as the 
executive branch of state government. Ramptom resolved to 
corral these independent operations by consolidating them 
into cabinet departments headed by his own appointees.
The Johnson-Goldwater presidential race produced the 
first Democratic legislature since the Roosevelt years and 
made that consolidation possible. The Republicans swept 
back into control of the legislaure two years later, but the 
governor chose the most able of those 2-year Democratic 
freshmen as his appointees to head the new departments sup 
ported by new funds.
By 1968 Rampton was chairman of a National Governors' 
Association subcomittee with responsibility for employment 
and training programs. He found that other governors 
shared his concern that federally funded manpower pro 
grams operated through state agencies without any control 
from the governor's office. Hearing national discussion 
about the need to decentralize and decategorize manpower 
programs, Rampton resolved to add that effort to his own 
consolidation drive. In 1969, he persuaded the state 
legislature to establish a state Manpower Planning Council,
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composed of all state agencies involved in employment and 
training, and authorizing the council to direct and coor 
dinate all such activities within the limits of federal law. 
Thus while the Congress was debating the CETA legislation 
from 1969 to 1973, Utah was operating a significant pilot 
program for all to see. In what would later emerge as CETA 
language, Utah was operating a statewide prime sponsor 
ship.
In another vagary of personality politics, Rampton, upon 
being elected to an unprecedented third term in 1972, sud 
denly moved from consolidation to decentralization as the 
thrust of the manpower policy of his final term. As CETA 
was being shaped with the Utah experience as a major 
model, the Utah statewide system was being, in effect, split 
up and delegated to nine local associations of government 
(AOG) which had originally emerged around reclamation 
and natural resource issues.
The State Manpower Planning Council, as a statutory 
body, continued to exist but became meaningless insofar as 
CETA was concerned. The original chairman, a Rampton- 
appointed university professor, and the executive director 
who was also state planning coordinator, resigned. The 
deputy director, a nationally experienced manpower expert, 
became director but soon found the position to have little 
clout and moved on to take over the public employment ser 
vice of a neighboring state. A State Office of Labor and 
Training (SOLT) was established, primarily to collect federal 
funds and disperse them largely autonomous to multicounty 
associations of government on the same formula by which 
they are allocated from the federal government to the state. 
As of 1980, Utah had six entities eligible to be CETA prime 
sponsors—Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City, Weber Coun 
ty, Davis County, Utah County, and a 25-county balance-of- 
state. Because each had the autonomy of individual prime 
sponsors and had won additional concessions from the state,
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the eligible jurisdictions, all of them strung along the 
Wasatch Front, agreed to remain within the official 
statewide prime sponsorship.
CETA in Utah appears on the Department of Labor's map 
as a single prime sponsor, but funding is immediately divided 
among the nine state associations of government. Funds for 
fiscal year 1979 were divided among those units in the pat 
tern shown by Table 1. Each planning district prepares its 
own annual plan and these are merely consolidated for the 
state plan.
Administering CETA in Utah
"Don't rock the boat" seemed to be the operating slogan 
of Utah's CETA program, but the program did not lack 
sound administration. Utah's high levels of education com 
pared with its relatively small size and its economy's orienta 
tion to the basic industry, have generally provided an ample 
supply of high quality public administrators. Despite the an- 
tifederal rhetoric heard in Utah political campaigns, the state 
has long had a reputation among federal agencies for 
outstanding conduct of federally funded programs. Com 
petency is high and turnover low at both the state and AOG 
levels in CETA. Each of the small AOGs have from two to 
five CETA staff positions and often share staff with related 
activities. Those eligible for independent prime sponsorship 
have staffs ranging from 5 to 43, whereas the state office 
employs a staff of 30. Most at all levels are college graduates 
and a high percentage have specialized advanced degrees in 
human resource management.
These are the people who make the CETA decisions. The 
elected officials of the multijurisdiction planning units are 
mostly part-time politicians and have very little involvement. 
The state office does not try to tell the AOG professionals 
what to do except "obey the law." The statutory statewide





































































a. These figures are prior to final accounting adjustments and do not include special projects or the Governor's grants.
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Manpower Planning Council has lapsed into disuse. A state 
Employment and Training Council has been created, but it 
can get no handle on the decentralized system. Each AOG 
has an advisory council, but few really give advice. CETA in 
Utah is a local staff responsibility.
A favorable economy, a small minority population, and a 
waiting list of relatively homogeneous CETA-eligible ap 
plicants simplify decisionmaking and administration. 
Whatever CETA funds are not earmarked for other pur 
poses go into classroom and on-the-job training, primarily 
the former. Until the 1980 recession, which slowed but did 
not reverse economic growth, job opportunities were plen 
tiful and obvious. CETA's task in Utah has been to prepare 
the disadvantaged for jobs. The eligible populations were 
sufficiently homogeneous to allow first-come, first-served 
policies to distribute the available slots except in the 
metropolitan Salt Lake City and Ogden areas and in the Uin- 
tah Basin, and Southeastern planning districts which include 
major Indian reservations.
The CETA planning process consists of (1) getting an 
estimate of available funds from the State Office of Labor 
and Training, (2) contracting with the one pubilc postsecon- 
dary training institution in the planning district for provision 
of classroom training (only two districts have more than one 
such institution), and (3) contracting with the state Job Ser 
vice for promotion of on-the-job training and for intake, 
determination of eligibility and placement. With these pro 
cesses established, neither planning nor administration is dif 
ficult. The State Office of Labor and Training makes no at 
tempt to shape or influence local decisions but offers 
technical assistance. The only complexities in CETA ad 
ministration are those imposed by federal legislation and 
regulation.
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The minority populations of Salt Lake City and Ogden are 
sufficient to place the local CETA staffs under some political 
pressure. In response, in Salt Lake County particularly, the 
CETA staff has chosen to allocate funds to community 
based organizations for orientation, adult basic education, 
English as a second language, and similar nonskill training 
activities, as well as a minimum number of on-the-job train 
ing slots. Having purchased peace at that price, the staff 
allocates most of the remainder of the budget to the skill 
center at the local public technical college and to Job Service, 
as in the other planning districts. As followup and evaluation 
have been largely ignored by the planning districts and have 
not been pushed by the state office, the administrative 
assignment of the planning districts consists of getting the 
contracts negotiated and the money out. In the rural districts 
the CETA director knows personally everyone involved in 
the delivery of CETA services and often every individual 
enrollee, so formal evaluation does not seem essential. For 
Job Service, the assignment consists of identifying CETA 
eligibles, adding them to a waiting list, and peeling them off 
for referral to on-the-job and classroom training. Employer 
contact representatives maintain established relationships 
with employers and continue to negotiate on-the-job training 
contracts with a limited number of establishments. New on- 
the-job training employers enter the system primarily at their 
own initiative. The system has been a simple one, with never 
a taint of scandal. At one end, complexities are added by 
federal requirements, but these are blunted by the state of 
fices which maintain all federal contacts and act as an in 
termediary vis-a-vis the planning district. At the other end, 
an internal squabble between the State Board of Vocational 
Education and the state Board of Regents about who should 
control postsecondary vocational education in the state adds 
the only touches of complexity confronting state and local 
CETA administrators.
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The Quality of Training
How good is the training under Utah's decentralized 
GET A system? The simplest generalization is "very good." 
GET A classroom training occurs in two technical colleges, 
one university, two 4-year colleges, three 2-year colleges, and 
four area vocational schools. One technical college and one 
4-year college operate separate skill centers maintained for 
CETA and other disadvantaged clients. All other classroom 
training follows the individual referral model, with all CETA 
enrollees included in the same classroom groups as the non- 
subsidized student body. Utah's educational institutions en 
joy high rankings and these institutions are among the state's 
best. The major issue, leaving aside for the moment the two 
skill centers, is whether the training needs of the CETA 
clientele are adequately met by immersion in mainstream 
training situations.
With the exception of the Indian population near the 
reservations and the minority populations where the skill 
centers exist, the answer appears to be yes. Statewide, blacks 
constitute 3 percent, Hispanics 14 percent, and Indians 4 per 
cent of the CETA population—in each case, about three 
times their overall population proportion. Only in counties 
containing skill centers do blacks exceed 5 percent of the 
CETA population. Hispanics exceed 10 percent only in the 
Wasatch Front and the mining-oriented southeast. American 
Indians exceed 6 percent of CETA enrollment only in the 
planning district which contains part of the Navajo reserva 
tion. Only 60 percent of CETA enrollees have high school 
educations, although only 13 percent of Utah's high school 
students leave before graduating.
At any rate, no planning district has any difficulty finding 
CETA eligible people capable of competing successfully with 
the non-CETA enrollees in the available training institu-
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tions. In fact, there are waiting lists of such people needing 
only tuition and training allowances to make training as at 
tractive as possible. Once enrolled, trainees are not iden 
tifiable among other students in the same classrooms. Excep 
tion in Wasatch Front North and South (Ogden and Salt 
Lake City and their environs), those who cannot compete in 
the classroom are relegated to work experience (if youth) or 
left out of CETA entirely, because they are unlikely to be ac 
ceptable to employers, public or private, hosting public ser 
vice employment or on-the-job training. CETA enrollees 
who enter these training institutions with CETA stipends get 
excellent training, and the vast majority (generally over 80 
percent) get jobs. Those not placed are typically women who 
withdraw from the labor market or youth who are not yet 
ready to settle into it.
The Salt Lake and Ogden residents and CETA system are 
more typical of national patterns. CETA enrollees in the 
Ogden area (Weber-Morgan planning district) are approx 
imately 9 percent black and 20 percent Hispanic. The Salt 
Lake County area (Wasatch Front South) enrolls 5 percent 
blacks, 22 percent Hispanics, 4 percent urban Indians, and 5 
percent Asians. Davis County, between the two districts 
geographically, enrolls 11 percent Hispanic but hardly any 
other minorities. These minority populations are large 
enough to have their own ethnic organizations. There is also 
a noticeable women*s movement in this metropolitan setting. 
As a result of the larger number of minorities enrolled in 
these counties, the training institutions there have been 
designed to handle a more disadvantaged population, and 
CETA planners have responded with a more diversified mix 
of programs. One can be less confident of the quality of 
training offered, but more assured that the disadvantaged 
are being served.
The Wasatch Front South district has allocated 74 percent 
of its II-B funds to classroom training and 19 percent to on-
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the-job training. Of the classroom training funds, 45 percent 
go to Skill Center South, administratively attached to the 
Utah Technical College at Salt Lake City; 45 percent for 
orientation, adult basic education, English as a second 
language, and similar employability related but nonskill 
training; and 10 percent to a nonprofit organization that 
assists women who wish to break into nontraditional jobs. 
Except for a few slots at the women's organization, the on- 
the-job training is managed by the Utah Job Service.
The quality of the training provided by the community- 
based organizations (CBOs) is doubtful at best, but may still 
be worthwhile. These CBOs lack both staff and facilities for 
quality training, but do provide access routes for the small 
groups of minorities who might otherwise be left out of the 
CETA action entirely. CBO support does not depend on 
large minority populations, but occurs wherever ethnic 
groups feel the need to organize. The CETA contracts offer 
the only significant funding source for the struggling CBOs. 
Funding them not only increases the visibility of minority 
populations but also offers a visible source for employers 
wishing to meet affirmative action requirements. In addi 
tion, significant portions of their enrollees then enter the 
skill centers.
The women in the nontraditional occupations program 
have a tough assignment in a traditional community. The 
program's success rate is low and it spends more effort on 
raising the level of consciousness and assertiveness among its 
enrollees than on providing skills or persuading employers. 
Its enrollment is small, its placement rate ranges from 33 per 
cent to 50 percent, and many of these jobs are not far from 
being traditional. However, many of its completers then 
enter the skill center for occupational training (in the tradi 
tional occupations). The effort is probably best thought of as 
a pilot project which should be tried without expecting quan 
titative success.
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The Salt Lake Skill Center suffers the same limitations as 
many similar institutions. It offers quality training to a 
disadvantaged population in a second class facility. 
Although the skill center's instructors have the same train 
ing, experience, and credentials as those on the technical col 
lege campus, its equipment and buildings are only marginally 
adequate. The curriculum is limited to clerical, auto 
mechanics, and welding programs.
The primary problem at the skills center is one of stigma. 
The skill center is clearly second-class when compared with 
the technical college programs. The trainee in a 26-week 
CETA course may get as much training of equal quality hour 
for hour at the skill center as the enrollee in a 1- or 2-year 
program at the technical college. But in both the students' 
self-assessments and the employers' assessments, those who 
can claim technical college credentials are way ahead.
The same problem exists for Skill Center North at Ogden. 
It is administratively attached to Weber State College, a 
4-year academic institution with a substantial on-campus 
2-year technical offering. The skill center is housed in an 
abandoned high school closer to the central city, which 
nevertheless is fully adequate; its instructors are fully 
qualified; and its equipment is more nearly adequate than at 
the Salt Lake Skill Center, because the whole operation is of 
more recent date. Skill Center North has its own curriculum 
development unit, a good library, and its own day care 
center. Its course offerings are broader, ranging over bench 
and service trades, building trades, clerical, health services, 
and metal trades, and supported by adult basic education, 
and English as a second language. Objectively, it maintains 
an excellent program. But still, the stigma is there. The short 
scope of the courses and the disadvantaged backgrounds of 
those eligible give some objectivity to those negative 
judgments, but there is probably a significant stigmatic com 
ponent from the facility itself. Providing CETA-sponsored
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courses on one or both of the two campuses would be an in 
teresting and worthwhile experiment in public relations.
Nevertheless, a placement rate averaging over 80 percent 
at a cost of only $1,650 per placement should remove any 
doubt that the current program is worthwhile. Education in 
the State of Utah is in a financial bind, squeezed between a 
taxpayer revolt and an extraordinarily high birth rate. What 
little state moneys have gone into training the adult disad- 
vantaged are likely to disappear. Federal training moneys 
available in Utah are on the decline. The waiting list of eligi 
ble applicants is already six months long and growing. The 
economy remains promising despite the 1980 slowdown. 
Facilities, equipment, and instructors are available for a 
doubling of enrollments. The only missing element is the in 
evitable one—budgets.
Conclusions
Prior to CETA, Utah was a national pioneer and in 
novator in employment and training activities. But the 
pioneer often experiments, shows the way, and then gets 
locked into some mode while those who followed pass it by. 
In Utah's current CETA stance, nothing is worthy of special 
notice and emulation. There is no significant labor market 
planning and no innovation. Nevertheless, there is in place a 
solid program resting upon service delivery by efficient and 
effective Job Service and vocational education systems. 
Federal statutory provisions, regulations, guidelines, and 
policies are given a scripture-like sanctity and followed to the 
letter. The system is a conservative one, seeking always to 
avoid conflict. Moneys are carefully accounted for, with 
never a breath of scandal. Most important, eligible enrollees 
get, for the most part, high quality training and jobs. This 
study has not examined nontraining services, but training is 
clearly the preference of nearly all actors in the system.
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The common thread throughout the entire history of 
employment and training programs in Utah has been the 
prominent role played by the Utah Job Service and the State 
Office of Vocational Education. Most of the area councils of 
government have obtained the services of well-educated and 
competent CETA planners and administrators. While the 
programs differ considerably from one AOG to another, 
there are few if any serious problems relating to improper 
management, misuse of funds, or failure to implement the 
programs in a timely fashion. Utah has managed to spend 
CETA funds as they became available.
The relationship between the Utah CETA administrators 
and the federal Department of Labor Officials has been both 
friendly and supportive. Utah has given little cause for 
federal monitors to be concerned. The regulations have been 
followed, and the State Office of Labor and Training has 
served to keep some distance between the federal represen 
tatives and the program operation levels. On the other hand, 
federal representatives have had no influence on the nature 
or quality of the programs.
Elected officials have not played a strong role in the Utah 
CETA system. In the rural areas, many elected officials serve 
only part time and generally lack interest and time to follow 
programs such as CETA, and policy is made by the CETA 
planner/administrator, with participation by representatives 
of the Job Service and educational agencies. In metropolitan 
areas, the elected officials have been more involved in plan 
ning because of the competition for funds and programs, but 
their involvement has usually been confined to an annual 
review of funding allocations. During the period when PSE 
was operating at its peak level, the elected officials became 
involved in the allocation of funds among departments want 
ing PSE slots, but their activity in PSE did not carry over in 
to other CETA programs.
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The decentralization of Utah's CETA system to the nine 
subgrantees changed the relationship between the federal 
program managers and the program operating levels by plac 
ing the state in the role of middleman, translator, and buf 
fer. It would be difficult, however, to identify any specific 
programmatic impact of this role. Indeed, the Utah CETA 
program operates under an umbrella at the local level 
without either a strong federal or state role. The State Office 
of Labor and Training can legitimately claim to be carrying 
out some functions which the federal managers would carry 
out if each of the eligible prime sponsors operated in 
dependently, so the "feds" may miss the Utah consortium 
more than anyone else. On the other hand, the new prime 
sponsors may learn for the first time how onerous federal 
regulations can be.
The work of the State Office of Labor and Training can 
not be separated from the general acknowledgement that the 
Utah Job Service is among the best in the country by all DOL 
rating schemes. The state's educational agencies likewise rate 
well in comparison with others throughout the country. Fur 
thermore, the local AOGs through 1980 had jealously pro 
tected their autonomy (there had not been time at the conclu 
sion of this study for them to react to the governor's an 
nouncement). In short, the Utah CETA system is very much 
a product of the institutions, traditions, and general level of 
public service in the state.
Organization, Management and Policy
The most important conclusion of this case study is the 
recognition that the present system seemed satisfactory to 
almost all of the actors. There was little or no pressure for 
change within the system itself, although Salt Lake County, 
Davis County, Utah County, and Salt Lake City had 
threatened to withdraw from the consortium. Each time an
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eligible prime sponsor threatened to pull out, the governor 
intervened to encourage a continuation of the system. The 
primary benefits of the consortium are increased overall 
funding and better services in the rural areas. The prospec 
tive urban prime sponsors have been told that a breakup of 
the consortium might endanger the cordiality of overall 
urban-rural relationships. In addition, the governor had 
resolved some non-CETA issues during discussions about 
the preservation of the consortium.
During 1980 the Mountainlands AOG, or more particular 
ly Utah County within that AOG, went on record as intend 
ing to pull out of the consortium the following year. This 
county has grown somewhat faster than the state as a whole 
and has claimed that it is being underfunded. The claim, 
while probably true, would not affect funding until alloca 
tion formulas are revised to conform with the 1980 census 
data. Present policy about using federal formulas to allocate 
funds among the subgrantees gives the state little flexibility 
in handing out money. In fact, the whole system has been 
remarkably free from controversy over fund allocations. In 
the midst of this apparent stability, the governor's an 
nouncement of intent to disband the consortium was a com 
plete surprise to all of the actors, except apparently the 
SOLT director who gave his advice concurrent with his 
resignation.
An important question is, "What can be done to restore 
some managerial and policy initiatives to employment and 
training programs in Utah?" The answer must begin with the 
simplification of the federal statute, a reduction in the 
number of separate programs that it entails, and more flex 
ibility for local decisionmaking. The local actors are 
somewhat intimidated by the system, but at the same time, 
they seem pleased with their ability and success in accom 
modating to it.
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A second change at the state level would require strong 
leadership from the governor's office and some attempt to 
focus on broader labor market aspects beyond the local 
AOGs. With the spread of large coal-fired power plants, the 
advent of the synthetic fuels program and other energy 
developments, and the possible deployment of the Air Force 
MX Missile system, the state appears to be on the verge of 
massive and perhaps disruptive development. In the years 
ahead, there is likely to be stronger support for more 
statewide planning. The governor could have chosen to use 
the statewide consortium as a vehicle for much of the labor 
market aspect of that planning. On the other hand, the 
metropolitan areas will be affected only indirectly by the 
pending energy and defense developments. A strong balance- 
of-state system dominated from the governor's office might 
be better able to shift CETA resources from one part of the 
state to another in accordance with need than could the pre 
sent system which assures each area of the state of its propor 
tion of limited CETA funds. Whatever happens, the pace of 
development makes clear the need for training and promises 
jobs for those trained.
Training Policy and Practice
Probably the single most important impact of Utah CETA 
and its predecessor and related programs has been to 
broaden the base of state funding for classroom training for 
high school dropouts. MDTA programs were coordinated in 
the larger cities by creating the two skill centers and pro 
viding more counseling and other support services, thus 
underscoring the needs of people who had dropped out 
before completing high school. The State Board of Educa 
tion first requested the legislature to raise the upper age limit 
at which the state educational program could pay for high 
school completion from 18 to 21. It then abolished the upper 
age limit completely, thereby making all area vocational
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centers, skill centers, and adult education programs of the 
various school districts eligible for regular state support to 
provide high school completion to dropouts regardless of 
age. These resources were utilized most effectively by those 
institutions which, because of their federal CETA, WIN, 
and related programs, were serving significant numbers of 
persons who had left school without a diploma.
A third step in the process occurred when the Board of 
Regents strengthened their claim over the governance of the 
two skill centers by obtaining from the state legislature a 
small but significant line item of support from state funds. 
As federal funding has declined appreciably, the existence of 
the high school completion support funds and the general 
appropriation have kept the two skill centers alive. The 
decline in federal CETA and WIN funds clearly will alter the 
nature of the institutions and the clientele they serve. The 
federal programs provide funds and disadvantaged enrollees 
and when federal funding declines, the state support will 
shift to enrollees who are less likely to be disadvantaged.
For the most part, the training in Utah is of high quality 
with institutions, curriculums, instruction, and facilities 
operating within the general framework of postsecondary 
public education. Except for the Salt Lake and Ogden areas, 
individual referrals to existing programs dominate classroom 
training. In the Ogden area, all training is done at the skill 
center except for a small project for the handicapped. In Salt 
Lake, the skill center is the largest training institution, but 
five CBOs also have relatively small programs.
Funding CBOs appears motivated as much by perceptions 
about the institutional identification and support for ethnic 
groups as by the need to provide high quality training. The 
criteria to be applied in funding allocations for CBOs and 
for the skill center are not, and probably cannot be, the 
same. The recognition of this fact seems to enforce the need
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to preserve local options and flexibility, but the forces that 
must be dealt with go far beyond any geographic area. The 
CBO is to the ethnic group or to the feminist movement in 
the modern city what the national grange movement and the 
national cooperative movement were to the farmers 50 years 
ago. GET A and its predecessor programs have been the one 
consistent source of funding sustaining these institutional 
developments. The CBOs in Utah provide opportunities for 
identification and self-realization to the groups in 
volved—both for the administrators and the clients served. 
Utah is an interesting setting from which to observe the 
CBOs because its minority population is less than 7 percent 
of the total. CBO support does not depend upon a large 
minority population any more than the success of the farm 
cooperative movement hinged on the size of a state's 
agriculture. The "movement" goes well wherever the setting 
creates an environment in which the ethnic groups feel the 
need to develop organizational and social support.
The skill centers are caught accidently in the issue of 
governance between the State Board of Vocational Educa 
tion and the Board of Regents. It is over who should govern 
postsecondary vocational education and would exist if there 
were no skill centers. It does complicate the lives of the skill 
centers, however. The funding and autonomy issues impact 
the centers more directly. Educational administrators dislike 
depending on funding from programs not under the control 
of the educational establishment. Education in Utah 
cherishes its autonomy and does not like the CETA funding 
process or the evaluation and monitoring from outsiders. 
Whether to maintain separate identities for the skill centers, 
absorb them into their parent institutions or, in the case of 
Skill Center North, transform it into an Area Vocational 
School, all are options centrally related to the issue of con 
trol.
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Those directly teaching or administering the training pro 
grams, however, are not concerned about these issues. They 
understand that CETA is a source of enrollees as well as 
funds, and the skill center staffs are generally committed to 
serving the enrollees referred under the CETA program. 
They are comforted by the fact that every study has praised 
their effectiveness. There are people whose need for training 
is very great and these same people achieve significant suc 
cess: between 6 and 8 of every 10 people served gain a 
substantial boost in income, employment, and self-image, 
although the immediate success rate declines during reces 
sion years.
The portion of Title II-B funds going into classroom and 
OJT training has risen in recent years from two-thirds to ap 
proximately four-fifths. There are waiting lists of persons 
who want to be enrolled but who cannot be served because 
programs are operating at capacity. In some cases prospec 
tive enrollees have waited from six months to a year to enter 
a program.
Among the most important conclusions of this study of 
CETA classroom training in Utah is that the present 
classroom training system could be doubled or even 
quadrupled without reaching all CETA-eligible clients. The 
training facilities can accommodate more students, and 
many eligible enrollees are not now being served or must wait 
too long for service. The long run promise is also for a rapid 
growth of jobs which can be met only by training or by im 
porting labor. Equally important, CETA has served to iden 
tify and refer to training significant numbers of disadvantag- 
ed people who would not receive training were it not for the 
CETA linkages between jobs, training, and income 
maintenance. While some progress is being made in educa 
tional circles to obtain more state funds for the disadvantag- 
ed, it is also clear that if CETA were to disappear, the disad-
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vantaged would be the first to be dropped from educational 
services.
If CETA is to continue as a major funding source for 
classroom training and for on-the-job training, the system 
should greatly expand efforts to develop curriculums and 
more importantly to finance training equipment and sup 
plies. Indeed, it may be appropriate to require state and local 
matching funds in defraying training costs to make possible 
the better funding of curriculum development and training 
equipment and facilities. Finally, institutions providing 
classroom training are not immune from the ravages of infla 
tion, and when increasing costs are incurred during a period 
of declining funding, the entire system is subjected to a 
serious strain that threatens not only quantity but quality of 
training as well. There is little in CETA funding and ad 
ministration that reflects an awareness of, or an effort to 
meet, the rising costs which inflation thrusts upon the pro 
gram operators.
Major Conclusions
Looking to what now exists, the important conclusions of 
this case study are:
1. Very little real planning is being done in Utah CETA, 
and the planning that is taking place is short 
term—usually confined to the next fiscal year.
2. CETA staff members defend their work but show lit 
tle real enthusiasm for the system within which they 
operate. The Utah vocational education establish 
ment divides almost equally between those who think 
CETA and similar programs will eventually disap 
pear, and those who think that CETA, or something 
which accomplishes much the same objectives, will 
continue indefinitely.
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3. State and local advisory councils play a very limited 
role in Utah CETA. They meet infrequently, show 
poor attendance, and function mainly to ratify CETA 
staff actions worked out in advance with the Job Ser 
vice and education authorities.
4. The entire system seems to be conservative and 
oriented toward avoiding risk and conflict. In achiev 
ing this goal, the system rates high marks.
5. One advantage of a CETA organization which 
delegates program responsibility to the local area 
councils of government is the coordination of CETA 
with other social programs in the rural areas. Here, 
staff positions are sometimes shared, the problems 
are small, the number of clients few, and the linkages 
well established.
6. Only in the Salt Lake/Tooele Wasatch Front South 
area does CETA take on the attributes of a system 
generally associated with larger cities. It is the only 
case in Utah where CBOs have contracts to provide 
services and where there is any degree of competition 
for the roles which Job Service and the public educa 
tion agencies perform elsewhere in the state.
7. The CETA system has made a great contribution to 
the current acceptance and strength of the Associa 
tions of Government (AOGs) by providing staff and 
program money to give these relatively new govern 
mental entities a strong role in their respective areas. 
Undoubtedly, this potential dominated the decision 
to decentralize the CETA system in 1972. To this ex 
tent, the current organization of CETA in Utah may 
be an accident of history—even so, it will not be easy 
to change.
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8. The statutory Utah Manpower Planning Council, 
created by the state legislature in 1969 with a mandate 
to coordinate all federally funded manpower pro 
grams within the state, has fallen into almost total 
disuse, even though it still exists on paper.
9. It is difficult to determine just what the State Office 
of Labor and Training staff might have done dif 
ferently given the diffusion of power and the decen 
tralization or fragmentation of the system. The exper 
tise of the state staff has been available to the local 
subgrantees, and its role in compiling reports, plans, 
and in establishing standards and interpreting regula 
tions and guidelines has been substantial. It would be 
too easy to reach a wrong conclusion and blame the 
SOLT staff for the demise of the once-strong state 
role in employment and training programs. The key 
decisions were made in the office of the governor, and 
any effective state-level impact on the administration 
of CETA would require the governor's power to 
coordinate the state's three major CETA actors; 
namely, the Job Service, the educational agencies, 
and the SOLT staff with local counterparts.
10. Through it all, eligible participants have received 
sound training and the preponderance of them have 
obtained jobs. That is the bottom line.
